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Abstract
We distinguish two representations of visual space: a cognitive representation drives perception, and a sensorimotor
representation controls visually guided behavior. Spatial values in the two representations are separated with the Roelofs effect:
a target within an off-center frame appears biased in a location opposite the direction of the frame. The effect appears for a verbal
measure (cognitive) but not for a jab at the target (sensorimotor). A 2-s response delay induces a Roelofs effect in the motor
measure, showing the limit of motor memory. Motor error is not correlated with reaction time. Subjects could strike one of two
identical targets, a process involving choice, without intrusion of a Roelofs effect, showing that the sensorimotor system can use
its own coordinates even when a cognitive choice initiates the motor processing. © 2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Evidence from many sources is converging on the
concept of a visual system with two distinct branches.
The systems share a common ‘early vision’ input, differ-
entiating only later in the processing stream. One sys-
tem, specialized for perception, will be identified as the
‘cognitive’ system. Its processing results in all the rich-
ness and variety of visual experience.
The other system, identified here as ‘sensorimotor’
following the terminology of Paillard (1987, 1991), is
specialized for visually guided behavior. It can control
motor activity even when adequate information for
localization is not available in the cognitive system. A
subject need not be aware of the processing of visual
information, i.e. need not perceive it, in order to jab,
hit, grasp, or otherwise interact with a visually present
object.
Some of the earliest evidence for this idea came from
rodents, where lesions of the superior colliculus led to
the inability to run a maze, combined with preserved
discrimination abilities in pattern discrimination. In
other animals, visual cortex lesions disturbed pattern
discrimination without interfering with maze-running
ability (Schneider, 1969). This forebrain–midbrain dis-
tinction seems to have changed over the course of
evolution, as both the pattern recognition and the
spatial orientation branches became corticalized into
cognitive and sensorimotor systems respectively in pri-
mates (Trevarthen, 1968).
According to this conception, early transformations
of visual information take place in a unified system.
Then, from a common origin in primary visual cortex,
information flows to two distinct branches of the visual
system. The cognitive system in primates follows a
course into the temporal lobe, while the sensorimotor
system extends to posterior parietal areas, creating an
anatomical dissociation between cortical areas coding
visual experience and areas handling the pickup of the
information that controls visually guided behavior. Ex-
perimental lesions in primates reveal this dissociation
between cognitive functions in a temporal brain region
and sensorimotor functions in a parietal region. Mon-
keys with lesions of the inferior temporal cortex have
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difficulty in performing visual discriminations (Pribram,
1971), but have good hand–eye coordination, while
animals with posterior parietal lesions have good dis-
crimination skills but are clumsy and uncoordinated in
reaching and grasping.
2. Neurophysiology in human patients
Human neurological patients show patterns similar
to those of lesioned. monkeys. Some patients show the
symptom of visual ataxia, an inability to reach for and
grasp objects appropriately despite being able to iden-
tify them. The deficit is not a general damage to motor
ability, for grasp that is not guided by vision can
remain normal. In ataxia patients, information in the
perceptual pathway is not available to control accurate
grasping and reaching. These patients have damage to
the sensorimotor system.
Another, less common group of patients has
difficulty with perception and object identification, but
can reach for and grasp objects accurately even though
their properties cannot be identified. One such patient
cannot identify the orientation of a slot cut into a disk
held before her. But when asked to extend her flattened
hand through the slot, she rotates her hand appropri-
ately (Milner & Goodale, 1995). Such patients have
damage to the cognitive system. This is a demonstra-
tion of a sensorimotor pathway possessing accurate
information that is not available to perception. Here
the definition of perception will be limited to perceptual
experience, events that a subject can remember and talk
about; it does not include information pickup without
experience.
Neurophysiological evidence has also implicated a
parietal pathway, specifically in the posterior parietal
region, in visually guided pointing behavior. This re-
gion is activated (among other regions) in PET scans
collected during visually guided pointing (Lacquaniti et
al., 1997).
Clinical studies have the limitation that the patients’
brains may become reorganized as a result of
their pathology. We cannot be sure that functions that
are distinct in brain-damaged patients or lesioned
monkeys are also distinct in normal brains, for the
brain may erect a ‘firewall’, dividing a normally
unified system so that at least part of normal function
can continue despite damage to another part of the
system. To know how these two pathways normally
operate and cooperate, they must be studied in
normal humans. This has become possible recently with
the development of psychophysical methods that can
isolate the two pathways and measure separately the
spatial information in each representation. Some
of these attempts have been successful, and others less
so.
3. Normal humans
Common sense tells us that one must accurately
perceive an object’s location and properties to interact
effectively with it. This intuition is in error, however:
there are now numerous experimental designs in which
humans produce effective motor behavior despite inad-
equate or erroneous perceptual information. Perception
is not required to visually guide an action. Early exper-
iments on separation of cognitive and sensorimotor
systems showed that normal subjects were unable to
perceive jumps of targets that take place during sac-
cadic eye movements (a cognitive-system function). But
the subjects could still point accurately to the new
locations of the same targets (a sensorimotor-system
function), even if their pointing movements were con-
trolled open-loop (Bridgeman, Lewis, Heit, & Nagle,
1979). This showed that information about the new
location of the target was accurate, but was not avail-
able to perception.
A more rigorous method of separating cognitive and
sensorimotor systems is by double dissociation, intro-
ducing a signal only into the sensorimotor pathway in
one condition and only into the cognitive pathway in
another (Bridgeman, Kirch, & Sperling, 1981). If each
manipulation can be performed without affecting the
representation in the other pathway, then they must
store spatial information independently. A fixed target
was projected in front of a subject, with a frame
surrounding it. When the frame was displaced left or
right, subjects had the illusion of stroboscopic induced
motion — the target appeared to jump in the opposite
direction. Target and frame were then extinguished,
and the subjects pointed to the last target position.
They pointed to the same location despite the induced
motion. The illusion did not affect pointing, showing
that the displacement was coded only in the cognitive
system.
In another condition we inserted displacement infor-
mation selectively into the sensorimotor system by
nulling the cognitive signal. Each subject adjusted the
real target jumps until the target appeared stationary,
with a real displacement in phase with the background
jump equaling the induced displacement out of phase
with the background. Thus, the cognitive pathway spe-
cified a stable target. Nevertheless, subjects pointed in
different directions when the target was extinguished in
the left or the right positions, showing that the differ-
ence in real target positions was still represented in the
sensorimotor pathway. This is a double dissociation
because in the first condition the apparent target dis-
placement affected only the cognitive measure, while in
the second condition the real displacement affected only
the sensorimotor measure.
If a moving target is sampled at different times for
different functions, apparent dissociations might result
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even though a unified visual representation underlies
each function. Recently, other methods have been de-
veloped to test dissociations of cognitive and sensori-
motor function without possible confounding effects of
motion, by using static illusions. One method is based
on the Ebbinghaus illusion, also called the Titchner
circles illusion. A circle appears to be larger if it is
surrounded by smaller circles than if it is surrounded by
larger circles. Aglioti, DeSouza and Goodale (1995)
exploited this illusion by making the center circle into a
three-dimensional (3D) poker chip-like object and ask-
ing subjects either to judge the size of the circle or to
grasp it. The grasp was adjusted closer to the real size
of the circle than to its illusory size. Subjects were able
to see their hands, however, so it is possible that they
adjusted their grasp not to the non-illusory true size of
the circle, but to the visible error between the grasp and
the edge of the circle. The adjustment did not occur
until just before the movement was completed, nearly
2 s after it started.
Recognizing this problem, Aglioti et al. (1995) noted
that calibration of grip aperture has been shown to be
largely refractory to visual information available during
a movement, relying instead on motor programming
that occurs before the movement begins. The experi-
mental support cited for this open-loop property, how-
ever, concerns movements to targets without illusory
size modifications, so that visual recognition of grasp
error and subsequent correction would not occur. The
movements can be controlled open-loop because no
correction is necessary. In a subsequent experiment that
avoids the feedback confound, Haffenden and Goodale
(1998) measured the Ebbinghaus illusion either by ask-
ing subjects to indicate the apparent size of a circle or
to pick it up, in both cases without vision of the hand
or the target. The illusion appeared for the estimations,
but was much smaller for the grasp, indicating that the
sensorimotor system was relatively insensitive to the
illusion.
There are several caveats to this result. First, binocu-
lar information appears to be necessary for the sensori-
motor system to overcome the illusion (Marotta,
DeSouza, Haffenden, & Goodale, 1998). Second, static
size illusions appear to influence the predicted weight of
an object, measured by the force used to lift it, even
when the illusions do not affect size of grip aperture
(Brenner & Smeets, 1996). Another experiment con-
trasting grasp and perception, using the Mu¨ller–Lyer
illusion, showed that while the illusion is smaller when
measured with grasp than with perception, there is
some illusion under both conditions (Daprati & Gen-
tilucci, 1997). Again, relatively slow grasp movements
may be responsible, and vision of both hand and
stimulus was allowed.
In summary, experiments in normal subjects suggest
behavioral evidence for a distinction between process-
ing in two visual streams, but we know very little about
processing in the sensorimotor pathway. With the ex-
ception of the saccadic suppression and the induced
motion methods reviewed above, all of the methods
address the properties of objects rather than their loca-
tions. A method was needed to examine egocentric
spatial localization in cognitive and sensorimotor
modes in normal subjects, without possible confounds
of motion and position.
4. Static cognitive and sensorimotor measures of
position
Another approach has produced large and consistent
contrasts between cognitive and sensorimotor systems,
differentiated by response measure. The dissociation is
based on another perceptual illusion, the Roelofs effect:
if a rectangular frame is presented off-center, so that
one of its edges is directly in front of the subject, that
edge will appear to be offset in the direction opposite
the rest of the frame. A rectangle presented on the left
side of the visual field, for example, with its right edge
in the center, will appear less eccentric than it is, and
the right edge will appear to be to the right of the
subject’s center (Roelofs, 1935).
We have extended and generalized this phenomenon
to apply it to the study of the two visual-systems
theory. First, the frame need not have one edge cen-
tered in front of the subject; illusions of location occur
whenever the frame is presented asymmetfically in the
visual field. Second, if a target is presented within the
offset rectangle, the target’s location tends to be mis-
perceived in the direction opposite the offset of the
frame. Misperception of frame position induces misper-
ception of target position; this is an induced Roelofs
effect, but will be called simply the Roelofs effect here.
Roelofs effects can be observed reliably if subjects
describe the target’s position verbally, a task that ad-
dresses the cognitive system. If their task is to point to
the target as soon as it disappears from view, however,
they are not affected by the frame position. This task
addresses the sensorimotor system. Motor behavior for
many subjects remains accurate despite the perceptual
mislocalization (Bridgeman, 1991).
The result is different if a delay is imposed between
the target disappearance and motor response. After a
delay of 4 s most subjects point in directions that are
biased by the cognitive illusion. This result was inter-
preted as a consequence of loss of veridical information
available only to the sensorimotor system: having lost
the accurate representation in that system, subjects
must import the remembered spatial information from
the perceptual system. In the process they import the
illusion as well, and the illusion serves as a marker for
the source of the information (Bridgeman, Peery, &
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Anand, 1997). Ability to transfer spatial information
from one system to another under some circumstances
does not mean that the two systems are really one, any
more than the ability of two people to communicate
under some circumstances would mean that they are
really one. Further, information transfer seems to go in
only one direction, from cognitive to sensorimotor rep-
resentations. Sensorimotor system information cannot
be used to make verbal judgments, even when it is
accurate and the verbal information is not.
A difficulty in interpreting these experiments was that
not all subjects showed the predicted pattern. In the
pointing condition, accessing the sensorimotor system,
half of the subjects showed no Roelofs effect in the
no-delay condition while the other half showed a robust
effect. The distribution of effect sizes was bimodal:
some subjects showed no sign of the Roelofs effect
while others showed a large and significant effect. This
inconsistency was interpreted with the assumption that
the latter subjects had already shifted to a memory
mode, and had to import the cognitive system’s repre-
sentation to control their pointing. To test this interpre-
tation, we predicted that imposing a delay would cause
the Roelofs effect to reappear in the motor measure for
the other subjects as well. Indeed, with a 4-s delay
nearly all subjects showed the predicted Roelofs effect
in pointing.
In our earlier studies, half of our subjects showed a
Roelofs effect with a motor measure and half did not,
even with no delay between stimulus offset and re-
sponse. Why did some subjects switch to importing
spatial information from the cognitive system? The
tendency to use cognitive spatial values to do a sensori-
motor task may originate from the control of the
pointing task. In aiming at a target, the subjects indi-
cated their opinion about target position to the experi-
menter, much as the subjects of Haffenden and
Goodale (1998) indicated with their fingers the per-
ceived size of a disc. Though the act in our case is
isornorphic with stimulus position, it is a communica-
tory act, and might be closely linked to cognitive repre-
sentations. An alternative is to require an instrumental
act, in which a subject must do something to the world
rather than simply indicate a position to another per-
son.1 Behavior with a purely instrumental goal might be
different from behavior with a communicatory goal,
even if both the stimuli and the motor movements
themselves are identical.
Thus in the current experiments we asked subjects to
jab a 3D target object, pushing it backward and making
a clicking noise. Their intention was not to communi-
cate anything, but only to do something to the world.
With this improvement in our measurement techniques
we achieve a cleaner separation of cognitive and motor
systems. With a quick jab at a 3D target, rather than a
pointing motion, almost all subjects show independence
from Roelofs effects in immediate action, along with
the previously observed robust Roelofs effects in verbal
estimation of position.
Because this series of experiments follows up on
earlier studies (Bridgeman et al., 1997), we were able to
take advantage of the results of those studies to im-
prove our experimental design. In the earlier data
nearly all of the variance in responses as a function of
target position was accounted for by a linear regression,
so in the current experiments we did not need to
present five target positions: two target positions would
give us the same information, and allow us to increase
the number of trials per condition. In measuring the
effects of delay in the earlier experiments we had begun
with a 4-s delay, but we found that almost all subjects
had already lost the information in the sensorimotor
pathway by that time. Here we investigate shorter
delays to determine the duration of the sensorimotor
system’s memory for position.
Using these improved techniques, we begin the job of
characterizing the psychophysics of the sensorimotor
system.
5. Experiment 1
Since previous work had shown the sensorimotor
representation to be definable with no delay, but to
have largely disappeared with a 4-s delay, this experi-
ment investigates the effects of shorter delays to define
the effective duration of information storage in the
sensorimotor representation.
5.1. Method
5.1.1. Subjects
Nine University of California undergraduates partici-
pated in the experiment, all right-handed with normal
or corrected-to-normal visual acuity. Four were male
and five female.
5.1.2. Apparatus
Subjects sat with heads stabilized before a white
hemicylindrical screen that provided a homogeneous
visual field 180° wide50° high. A lever box located in
front of the screen presented five white levers, each 1.8°
wide, spaced 2.5° apart center-to-center (Fig. 1). The
center lever, marked with a black stripe, functioned as
the target. Each lever was hinged at its base and
spring-loaded. It activated a microswitch when pushed
backward by 5 mm. A long black baffle hid the mi-
croswitch assembly without revealing the position of
the lever array. In the motor condition, the task was to1 We thank Prof. Josef Pemer, Salzburg, for this suggestion.
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jab the black target stripe rapidly with the right
forefinger. The remaining levers served to record the
locations of inaccurate responses.
A rectangular frame 38° wide1° in line width was
projected, via a galvanic mirror under computer con-
trol, either centered on the subject’s midline, 6° left, or
6° right of center (Fig. 1). Inside the frame, the lever
box occupied one of two positions, 3.5° left of center or
3.5° right of center. On each trial the frame and target
were positioned in darkness during the intertrial inter-
val. Then a computer-controlled shutter opened for one
second. Stray light from the projected frame made the
screen and the levers visible as well. As soon as the
shutter closed, the subject could jab the target or ver-
bally indicate its position in complete darkness. Re-
sponses were recorded by the computer on an absolute
scale (lever 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5).
5.1.3. Procedure
5.1.3.1. Cogniti6e measure. The two response measures
were designed to access the two visual pathways selec-
tively. For the cognitive system the subject verbally
estimated the position of the target spot on the center
lever. The choices were ‘far left’, ‘left’, ‘center’, ‘fight’,
or ‘far right’, so that the response was a five-alternative
forced choice. The choices were identified with the five
lever positions, which were centered before the subject
during the instruction period, when the screen was
illuminated by general room lighting and the frame was
not projected. The five levers, and nothing else, were
visible when the five alternatives were defined. By
equating the responses with the visible levers in the
apparatus, we could assign estimations in degrees of
angle to the qualitative verbal responses. Interpretation
of the data depends upon presence or absence of
Roelofs effects, however, not on absolute calibrations
of the cognitive measure. In the present series of exper-
iments the cognitive measure serves as a control to
assure that a cognitive illusion is present, differentiating
the cognitive and sensorimotor systems.
Subject instructions in the verbal condition empha-
sized an egocentric calibration. Quoting from the writ-
ten instructions that were read to each subject, ‘In this
condition you will be telling the experimenter where
you think the target is in relation to straight ahead.’
Further, ‘If the target looks like it’s directly in front of
you, you will indicate this by saying ‘center’’. Thus
center was defined in terins of the subject’s body rather
than the apparatus or the frame.
5.1.3.2. Sensorimotor measure. The subject rested the
right forefinger on a foam pad mounted on the
centerline of the apparatus just in front of the chin
rest, then jabbed the target with the forefinger as soon
as the target disappeared. Thus both cognitive and
sensorimotor measures were open-loop, without error
feedback. Before the experimental trials began,
subjects practiced jabbing the target — some were
reluctant to respond vigorously at first for fear of
damaging the apparatus. Subjects then received at least
ten practice trials in the jab condition and ten the
verbal condition.
5.1.3.3. Trial execution. A computer program randomly
selected target and frame positions, with the exception
that an identical set of positions could not occur on two
successive trials. For verbal trials, the experimenter
recorded the subject’s response by typing a number
(1–5) on the computer’s keyboard corresponding to the
subject’s verbal estimate. The computer recorded motor
responses automatically.
In each trial one of the two target positions and one
of the three frame positions was presented, exposed for
1 s, and extinguished. Since the projected frame pro-
vided all of the illumination, target and frame exposure
were simultaneous. A computer-generated tone told the
subject to respond. For no-delay trials the tone
sounded as the shutter extinguished the frame, while on
other trials the tone began after a 1 or 2-s delay. During
the delay the subject sat in darkness. Two target posi-
tions three frame positions two response modes
three delays resulted in 36 trial types. Each trial type
was repeated ten times for each subject, resulting
in a data base of 360 trials:subject. There was a brief
rest and a chance to light adapt after each block of 60
trials.
Data were collated on-line and analyzed statistically
off-line. Two-way ANOVAs were run for each subject,
each response mode, and each delay condition. Factors
were frame position and target position. Summary
statistics were analyzed between subjects.
Fig. 1. Apparatus used in the verbal judging and motor jabbing
experiments (not to scale). The five levers were real 3-D objects, while
the background rectangle was projected through a shutter from a
tungsten-halogen bulb.
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Fig. 2. Mean verbal responses, used to assess the cognitive visual system, averaged across subjects. Roelofs effects, seen as separations between
the diagonal lines in each panel, were significant for all conditions. The legend indicates position of the projected frame.
5.2. Results
5.2.1. Cogniti6e measure
The Roelofs effect, measured as a main effect of
frame position, was significant under all delay condi-
tions (Fig. 2). Subjects tended to judge the target to be
further to the left than its actual position when the
frame was on the right, and vice versa. In the no-delay
condition six of seven individual subjects showed a
significant Roelofs effect (F(2,5)\8.43, PB0.05), and
the magnitude of the Roelofs effect averaged across
subjects was 2.23° (S.E. 0.86°). In the 1-s delay condi-
tion eight of nine subjects showed a significant Roelofs
effect using the same statistical criteria, and the magni-
tude of the effect was 2.30° (S.E. 0.86°). In the 2-s delay
condition six of eight subjects showed a significant
effect; the magnitude of the effect was 2.33° (S.E.
0.96°). Technical problems made data unavailable for
some subjects in the no-delay and 2-s delay conditions.
5.2.2. Sensorimotor measure
In the no-delay condition, the results can best be
summarized with the generalization that subjects hardly
ever missed the target, regardless of target position or
frame position (Fig. 3, left panel). Seven of eight sub-
jects showed no significant Roelofs effect (frame effect
P\0.094). Averaged across subjects, the magnitude of
the Roelofs effect was 20 min arc (S.E. 22 min arc).
Performance rapidly deteriorated when a forced delay
was interposed between stimulus offset and response.
At 1-s delay (Fig. 3, center) there was a small but
significant effect in half of the subjects (PB0.05, n
4), and no effect in the other half (P\0.228, n4, Fig.
3, center). Average magnitude of the effect was 17 min
arc (S.E. 12 min arc). At 2 s delay (Fig. 3, right) five
subjects showed a significant effect (PB0.05) while
four did not (P\0.237), for an average magnitude of
44 min arc (S.E. 12 min arc).
5.2.3. Comparison of the two measures
A separate ANOVA was run to compare the cogni-
tive and sensorimotor conditions, using response mode
as an independent variable and the magnitude of the
frame effect as the dependent variable. This ANOVA
showed a significant difference between cognitive and
motor measures (F1,4312.45, P0.001), as expected
from the robustness of Roelofs effects with the cogni-
tive measure and the absence of Roelofs effects at short
delays with the motor measure.
The sizes of the Roelofs effects under various condi-
tions can be compared by measuring the difference
between average response with the target on the right
and with the target on the left in Figs. 2 and 3. The
cognitive measure shows a large and consistent devia-
tion that is unaffected by delay, replicating Bridgeman
et al. (1997), while the sensorimotor effect slowly grows
as delay increases. At 2-s delay, the frame’s influence
becomes significant for the majority of subjects.
5.3. Discussion
In addition to replicating some of the results of
Bridgeman et al. (1997), this experiment showed that
the sensorimotor pathway maintains veridical informa-
tion about target position (unaffected by visual context)
for about 2 s. At 1-s delay the sensorimotor system’s
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behavior is similar to what it was without delay (Fig.
3); at 2 s a small but consistent Roelofs effect begins to
appear, where visual context affects isomorphic motor
behavior. Beyond that time Roelofs effects dominate
the motor responses; by 4 s almost all subjects show
significant Roelofs effects with a sensorimotor measure
(Bridgeman et al., 1997).
Slopes of the verbal functions are consistently less
than 1 (Fig. 2), indicating that subjects tend to perceive
the target closer to the center of the array than it
actually is. This effect has been observed with verbal
measures in previous work both on the Roelofs effect
and by others (i.e. Pagano & Bingham, 1998), and is
not an artifact of the five-alternative forced-choice re-
sponse method (Bridgeman et al., 1997). Since the
slopes of the functions and the separation of the func-
tions for each frame position are independent parame-
ters, the slope does not affect the magnitude of the
Roelofs effect. In fact, the Roelofs effect can be evalu-
ated at any one frame position, so that slope is not a
factor. The slopes may be less than 1 because subjects
tend to fixate the target visually, and the oculomotor
efference copy has a gain of less than 1. Thus eccentric-
ity would be underestimated.
The slopes of the Roelofs functions agree quantita-
tively with this hypothesis. The cleanest measure of the
slope of the response function, with minimal interfer-
ence from eccentric frame positions or response delays,
is the verbal measure with the frame centered and no
response delay (Fig. 2, left panel, center data line). The
slope of this line is 0.63, which can be compared to a
static efference copy gain of 0.61 obtained by the
technique of Bridgeman and Stark (1991). The slope is
also close to an earlier estimate of efference copy gain,
calculated from data of Dichgans, Ko¨rner and Voigt
(1969) to a range of 0.60–0.63 (Bridgeman, 1995).
While the close agreement of slope and efference copy
gains may be coincidental, the data are consistent with
the hypothesis that the static efference copy gain is
responsible for the slopes of the response functions with
a verbal measure. In contrast, the larger slopes in the
motor measure must come from sources other than
efference copy alone.
6. Dissociation of cognitive and sensorimotor signals
The most rigorous way to segregate cognitive and
sensorimotor representations is with double dissocia-
tion, showing one case where spatial information af-
fects only the cognitive system and another where
similar spatial information affects only the sensorimo-
tor system (Bridgeman et al., 1981). To demonstrate a
double dissociation of perceptual and sensorimotor sys-
tems in the present data, it is necessary first to deter-
mine perceived positions while motor behavior is held
constant, and then to determine motor behavior while
perceived position is held constant. This process is
described in Figs. 4 and 5, for the zero-delay
conditions.
The first step is to determine the actual target posi-
tions that would be present when the motor response is
nulled. In a spatial array the definition of a null point
is arbitrary, but the most neutral point is the straight-
ahead direction, with the target deviating neither to the
subject’s left nor to the right. Thus we define the null
Fig. 3. Mean motor responses, used to assess the sensorimotor visual system, averaged across subjects. Display format as in Fig. 2.
Near-superimposition of the diagonal lines indicates that subjects were not influenced by the frame position when they jabbed the target.
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Fig. 4. Verbal response under conditions in which subjects indicate
that the target is straight ahead with the motor measure. Verbal data
(top) are taken from the left panel of Fig. 2, and motor data (bottom)
are taken from the left panel of Fig. 3.
verbal-condition data lines. These are at widely differ-
ing locations, because the frame biases the perceived
locations in the Roelofs effect.
In the final step, the points where the jab data and
the verbal data intersect are projected horizontally over
to the axis on the left side of the upper graph of Fig. 4.
The horizontal lines intersect the verbal response axis in
locations where subjects would would perceive the
targets to be when they point at them straight-ahead.
They would perceive the targets in the indicated dis-
parate positions. Thus we have nulled the motor re-
sponses and found large signal offsets in the cognitive
system’s spatial values.
The inverse situation is shown in Fig. 5, where the
bottom panel shows the actual positions of the targets
when the subject perceives them to be straight ahead
(from Fig. 2, left panel). Because of the Roelofs effect,
the frame’s position introduces considerable variation
into the actual target positions. Data analysis follows
the same steps outlined for Fig. 4. When projected onto
the motor responses (top panel), we see that motor
responses would occur at widely varying positions (de-
pending on frame position) for targets that are per-
ceived to be straight ahead. Thus, nulling the verbal
response position reveals large signals in the sensorimo-
tor system. Combining this result with the one dis-
cussed in the previous paragraphs leads to a double
dissociation between cognitive and sensorimotor repre-
sentations of visual space (Fig. 6).
7. Experiment 2
One reason for the differences between subjects in the
motor measure, with some subjects showing significant
Roelofs effects and others showing no effects, might be
a difference in response latency. If some subjects re-
spond quickly, while sensorimotor pathway memory is
still intact, while others respond only after memory in
the sensorimotor pathway has dissipated, we might see
longer response latencies in subjects who demonstrate a
Roelofs effect in jabbing. To investigate these effects,
we repeated the motor condition of Experiment 1 while
measuring reaction time (RT). At the same time we
investigated the behavioral effects of longer delays.
7.1. Method
7.1.1. Subjects
Six University of California undergraduates partici-
pated. All were right-handed and had normal or cor-
rected-to-normal acuity.
7.1.2. Apparatus and procedures
Design of the experiment was the same as in Experi-
ment 1 except that RT was measured by the laboratory
position as a motor jab in the straight-ahead direction.
Subjects did not see trials with targets in the straight-
ahead direction, but since we know from Bridgeman et
al. (1997) that motor jabs to eccentric target positions
predict very well the positions of jabs to targets in more
central positions, we can use linear interpolation to find
where subjects would jab to targets that are straight-
ahead.
In Fig. 4, bottom panel, the motor data (from Fig. 3,
left panel) are replotted. A horizontal line is drawn
through the data at a level where the response is at
zero, or straight ahead. The points where this line
crosses the three data plots show target positions where
subjects would jab straight ahead. Because of the lack
of a Roelofs effect, the corresponding target positions
are very close together for the three frame positions on
the graph.
The next step is to project these three positions,
representing the target positions where subjects jab
straight ahead, onto the plot of the verbal data (Fig. 2,
left panel). This will tell us where the subjects would
have perceived tha targets to be when they jabbed at
them straight ahead. Projecting the null-response lines
vertically up to the verbal data (top panel), we find the
points where the three target positions intersect the
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Fig. 5. Motor response under conditions in which subjects perceive the target to be straight ahead as assessed with the verbal measure. Motor data
(top) are taken from the left panel of Fig. 3, and verbal data (bottom) are taken from the left panel of Fig. 2.
computer that controls the experiments, from onset of
the auditory response cue to the click of the mi-
croswitch on a response bar. The zero-delay condition
was the same as in Experiment 1. Delays were increased
to 2 and 4 s, the first value matching the maximum
delay in Experiment 1 and the second matching the
minimum delay in our previous work (Bridgeman et al.,
1997). Only the motor-response condition was run.
7.1.3. Statistical analysis
RTs of less than 40 ms were rejected as anticipations.
RTs of more than 1 s were rejected because they usually
resulted from a subject failing to jab firmly enough to
trip a response microswitch on the first try, so that the
computer recorded a second try. The remaining RTs
were normalized with an arcsin transformation, and
each statistical test was performed once with raw data
and again with transformed data. Differences in the
results from the two sets of tests were negligible; only
the results for transformed data are reported here.
Accuracy is defined as signed error and measured as
standard deviation. Since both error and reaction time
are dependent variables, the relation between the two
was examined with correlation techniques. Statistical
techniques were otherwise identical to those of Experi-
ment 1.
7.2. Results
7.2.1. Roelofs effect
None of the subjects showed a Roelofs effect in the
no-delay condition. As delay increased there was an
Fig. 6. Double dissociation of cognitive and sensorimotor systems,
based on data replotted from Figs. 5 and 6.
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increasing tendency to show a Roelofs effect; for five of
the six subjects, ANOVA showed a significant effect of
delay interval on the magnitude of the Roelofs effect
(min. F(2,15)3.75, P0.048) with frame and delay
as factors.
7.2.2. Reaction times
Mean RT was 482 ms at zero delay, 541 ms at the 2-s
delay, and 551 ms at the 4-s delay. An ANOVA with
factors of target position, frame position and delay
showed that this increase in RT with response cue delay
was significant in five of the six subjects (min.
F(2,108)1.95, P0.0016 or less).
The relationship of RT to response error was ana-
lyzed at each of the three delays for each of the six
subjects. Only one of the 18 resulting linear regressions
was significant at PB0.05, and this result can be
attributed to spurious correlation. In other words, the
latency of response was not related to the accuracy of
that response. Reasoning that the fastest RTs test most
strongly the hypothesis that faster reaction times should
result in less error, we also analyzed the fastest reaction
times. For each subject, the fastest RT at zero spatial
error was subtracted from the fastest RT at the maxi-
mum error for the corresponding delay condition.
Again, none of the differences were statistically signifi-
cant (maximum t(5)2.43, P0.06). Thus even at
zero response delay, where there was no bias from the
Roelofs effect, response variability and RT were
unrelated.
7.3. Discussion
The Roelofs effect results are consistent with Experi-
ment 1, with longer delay times. Again the jabbing
responses were insensitive to the position of the visual
context at zero delay, but the context had an increasing
effect as delay increased.
RT, defined as the interval between the onset of the
response cue and the closing of the target’s mi-
croswitch, increased as the enforced delay increased.
This result could have been due to decreased vigilance
after longer delays, or to greater uncertainty about the
expected time of cue onset as delay increased. The weak
relationship of RT to response error shows that the
most accurate responses were not necessarily the fastest.
Since the estimate of the duration of motor memory
from Experiment 1 is about 2 s, and most RTs were in
the range of 400–600 ms, the quality of spatial infor-
mation available for jabbing apparently did not change
significantly within the small range of variation in RT.
The result also contradicts Fitts’ law, which predicts
greater response variability at the fastest RTs. In the
zero delay condition, where Roelofs biases are not an
issue, fast responses were as accurate as slow ones. A
degrading sensorimotor system’s memory for position
might have resulted in larger effors at longer latencies.
Fitts’ law predicts the reverse, a speed–accuracy trade-
off. It is possible that the two effects cancelled at the
level of response execution, yielding a nonsignificant
result overall. Alternatively, the range of RTs may have
been too small for a Fitts’-law relationship to emerge.
The current method cannot test these hypotheses
directly.
8. Experiment 3
We hypothesize that the cognitive representation of
visual space exhibits the Roelofs effect because
it specializes in pattern recognition rather than localiza-
tion. In contrast, the sensorimotor representation does
not show the Roelofs effect because egocentric localiza-
tion is fundamental to its evolutionary function. The
sensorimotor system was probed with an isomorphic
task, in which there is a 1:1 relationship between the
position of the target and the position of the extended
finger during jabbing. No decision was necessary be-
cause only one target was displayed. The experiments
required a temporal decision about when to act
(triggered by the sound of the tone), but the spatial
decision about where to act was trivial and always the
same.
The function of the cognitive system is to make
decisions about objects and events in the visual world:
‘who is there’, ‘is that a banana’, ‘is it ripe’, etc. In
contrast, isomorphic behavior in the sensorimotor sys-
tem requires no decisions about object identity. It an-
swers questions such as ‘where is that branch’, ‘how far
is the next stepping stone’, etc. Isomorphic motor be-
havior must be linear to be effective, while a decision
represents a nonlinearity. Because the sensorimotor sys-
tem has no memory, its information basis for decision-
making must be very limited. Can the sensorimotor
system continue to govern behavior when both a deci-
sion and an isomorphic response are required?
To explore this question, we conducted an experi-
ment in which a judgment about which of two possible
targets to jab was combined with the motor response.
The Roelofs effect is again used as a marker for the use
of information in the cognitive system. If the motor
response remains accurate and does not show a Roelofs
effect, we assume that the decision process is handled
within the sensorimotor system. A Roelofs effect in the
two-target condition of this experiment would suggest
that the cognitive system must control behavior in tasks
that require both isomorphic response and decision. In
addition, subjects could not perform accurately simply
by jabbing where they had fixated during the exposure
period, because the chance of the last fixation being on
the correct target was only 50%.
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Fig. 7. Left: Jabbing performance in a control condition similar to the left panel of Fig. 3. Right: Jabbing in a condition that is similar except
that two targets are present, separated by 5 deg. Graphs are corrected so that correct responses to the left target and to the right target
superimpose. Subjects are able to act without systematic disturbance from the frame position, even while they are making a cognitive decision
about which of the two targets to jab.
8.1. Method
8.1.1. Subjects
Four of six new subjects were from the same popula-
tion as in Experiments 1 and 2. Two additional older
subjects, one naive about the purpose of the study, also
participated. All had normal or corrected-to-normal
visual acuity.
8.1.2. Apparatus and procedure
The apparatus is the same as that used in Experi-
ments 1 and 2, except that two targets were displayed in
the decision condition. Only motor no-delay trials were
run. Since errors in these trials were rare and generally
small in Experiments 1 and 2, we needed only one
flanking lever for each of two target levers to record
errors. The second and the fourth levers became the
targets, each marked with a black rectangular target
area as in Experiments 1 and 2. The non-target levers
(the far left, center, and far right) were white.
In the decision condition, a low-pitched or high-
pitched beep sounded upon offset of the stimuli. Sub-
jects were instructed to jab the left target if they heard
a low beep, or to jab the right target if they heard a
high beep. Subjects were not able to fixate the target
visually because they were unaware of which stimulus
would become the target until after stimulus offset.
Thus, this condition tested the capacity of the internally
stored sensorimotor representation.
During training, the subject was familiarized with
associating a high- or low-pitched beep with each target
condition. Frame and target positions were presented in
pseudorandom order in each block of 60 trials for each
condition. In the control condition there was only one
target, on the third (center) lever, replicating the motor
no-delay trials of Experiments 1 and 2.
Separate two-way ANOVAs were run for each sub-
ject and each condition (with factors target main effect,
frame main effect, and interaction). The ANOVAs as-
sessed errors, calculated as the distance of each re-
sponse from the correct lever (i.e. two or four).
Response time was recorded to evaluate hesitation (and
thus confidence) of responses.
8.2. Results
As expected, there was no main effect of frame
position (and thus, no Roelofs effect) for the one-target
control condition (F(2,30)B3.32, P\0.05), as shown
in Fig. 7, left panel.
Subjects were able to use information coded in the
sensorimotor system, uninfluenced by the Roelofs ef-
fect, in the task involving both a decision and an
isomorphic motor response. We found no frame effect
for the two-target condition in any of the subjects
(maximum F(2,30)3.31, P\0.05) (Fig. 7, right
panel). This finding implies that the cognitive process-
ing involved in making a simple left-right decision does
not engage the cognitive system’s map of visual space,
as would have been revealed by a Roelofs effect in the
motor response. The range of error in the one-target
condition (90.10–0.31°) was smaller than in the two-
target condition (90.17–1.61°), though RTs were not
significantly different.
8.3. Discussion
The finding of accurate jabbing in the one-target
condition replicated Experiment 1. More important is
the lack of a Roelofs effect when a choice between two
similar targets is required. Independence from frame
effects is a marker for the use of sensorimotor-system
information. Apparently the cognitive system can in-
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form the sensorimotor system about which of two
possible targets to approach, and the sensorimotor
system can use its own egocentrically calibrated spatial
information to guide the movement.
It is not clear how this can be achieved, because the
codes of the cognitive and the sensorimotor systems
should be incompatible. The cognitive system’s code for
visual information is object-centered, with space repre-
sented as relations among visual objects. We have
impressions about what is in front of us and what is to
the sides, but we are frequently in error. The universal-
ity of the Roelofs effect and other context-based local-
ization illusions in perception is evidence for this.
The sensorimotor system, in contrast, possesses an
egocentric calibration that is inaccessible to perception
but can be used to control visually guided behavior. In
transferring information from the cognitive to the sen-
sorimotor representation, the cognitive system would
have to inform the sensorimotor system in object-rela-
tive coordinates about which bar to jab. But the senso-
rimotor system is insensitive to object relationships, and
generates motor commands that link visually derived
positions with eye or limb movements.
Eye fixation position, driven by visual attention,
might enable the two incompatible codes to be linked.
If the position of fixation becomes the only relevant
image parameter for the sensorimotor system, visual
space would collapse around that single point, and
context would become irrelevant. This strategy would
require either oculomotor fixation on the intended
target or a planned saccade to the target, however. In
our experiment the subjects did not know which target
would be jabbed while they were visible, but they could
have fixated on both. Experiments monitoring eye
movements before and during motor action will be
needed to test this hypothesis.
9. General discussion
The interpretation that our results are due to a
dissociation between cognitive and sensorimotor visual
systems is based on the following factors: (1) A large
and consistent Roelofs effect is seen for cognitive mea-
sures at zero delay, but none is seen for sensorimotor
measures. (2) With increase in response delay the senso-
rimotor measure changes, while the cognitive measure
does not. (3) The results are consistent with psycho-
physical, neurophysiological and clinical data of others.
Action can be divided into three levels: eye move-
ments, movements of body parts, and locomotion. The
first level, eye movement, normally functions without
conscious intervention, though some kinds of saccadic
eye movements can be initiated voluntarily. As Wong
and Mack (1981) showed, saccadic eye movement con-
trol can take advantage of veridical, egocentrically or-
ganized spatial information that is either currently
present in the retinal input, or is used to aim saccades
within a few hundred msec of stimulus offset. At longer
delays, though, cognitive illusions (induced motion in
this case) distort saccadic control.
The empirical work described in this paper is at the
body parts level. Experiment 1 shows that information
coded in this system is available for open-loop control
for about 2 s; after that, cognitive information must be
imported into the sensorimotor system to control be-
havior. Milner and Goodale (1995) describe many other
characteristics of this component. Their studies concern
perception or motor engagement with objects and prop-
erties of objects, such as size or orientation, while our
studies concern egocentric localization of objects. The
three levels are defined in terms of body parts used and
the time needed to execute actions; thus, throwing or
other ballistic actions belong to this level, even if their
eventual result is delayed or at a distance.
The sensorimotor branch at this level is capable of
veridical localization under conditions where the cogni-
tive branch is the victim of illusions of location induced
by biased visual contexts. Using a task that did not
involve illusions, Pagano and Bingham (1998) demon-
strated independence of errors in a perceptual and a
sensorimotor task. Consistent with the characteriza-
tions of cognitive and sensorimotor systems proposed
here, they find that verbal judgments are anchored to
the range of experienced distances (a property requiring
a memory of past trials) while the motor responses are
more closely related to the information available in a
single trial. Their result can be interpreted in terms of
the present two-visual systems hypothesis, but it can
also be interpreted as a difference in task-specific orga-
nizations. Deciding between these two interpretations
requires analysis of the present results and the neuro-
logical literature on the effects of parietal versus tempo-
ral lesions.
Decisions about what to do, even in a motor task,
normally originate from the cognitive branch. Objects
of intended action are selected in the cognitive system,
yet accurate isomorphic action is still possible based on
information held in the sensorimotor system.
The locomotion level will not be reviewed in detail
here, because it is not directly addressed by the current
experiments. This level is isolated in studies where
subjects can interact with a visual environment only
through locomotion, walking or climbing through it.
For example, perception of distance on the order of
meters, measured by having subjects mark equal-ap-
pearing intervals, is non-linear, with large errors. But
when subjects walk to a target, they do so accurately
(Loomis, DaSilva, Fujita, & Fukusima, 1992). When
another target was placed twice as far away as the
original one, subjects walked twice as far, despite their
distorted perceptual judgments. This experiment ex-
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pands and formalizes a common experience: one can
ask a person to judge a distance to a target by any
measure (number of arm spans, meters, etc.) and re-
ceive wildly erroneous estimates. But when asked to
walk to the same target, the same person does not
suffer from the verbally obtained distortions.
Recent experiments have shown that the locomotor
system’s accurate spatial map, like that in our pointing
and jabbing experiments, has a limited memory.
Proffitt, Bhalla, Gossweiler and Midgett (1995) have
found that subjects greatly overestimate the steepness
of a hill with verbal estimates, but are much more
accurate if asked to adjust a tilt board to match the
slope. After a delay, however, the tilt-board estimate is
significantly steeper, in the direction of the cognitive
overestimate. So again it seems that after a delay the
cognitive system informs isomorphic motor responses
as well as verbal judgments. Here, however, motor
estimates remain accurate for at least a few minutes
following termination of exposure to the stimulus
situation.
A few consistent rules apply to all three of these
components of the sensorimotor branch of vision. All
three show an initial response that is more veridical
than the corresponding cognitive measures, and all
begin to show errors in the direction of cognitive mea-
sures after a delay. The critical delay in each system
seems to correspond closely to the amount of time
required to execute a meaningful interaction with the
world in the corresponding motor output modality; on
the order of hundreds of msec for saccade control,
seconds for arm and head movements (Jakobson &
Goodale, 1991 and the present results), and minutes for
hill-climbing or other locomotion. Each component
seems to hold information long enough to act on it, but
no longer. In each case, cognitive information can
coexist with contradictory motor information in the
nervous system without apparent conflict, showing the
need for a segregation of the cognitive and sensorimo-
tor representations. And in each case, not only visual
direction but other aspects of the world must be en-
coded accurately as well.
The two-visual-systems interpretation can help to
organize the large literature on spatial orientation; we
need not expect studies measuring cognitive-system ca-
pabilities to show results consistent with studies mea-
suring sensorimotor-system capabilities, or vice-versa.
Many studies of locomotion, for example, relate to a
sensorimotor branch of locomotor control, without
necessarily invoking a perceptual role in adjusting loco-
motor behavior to current conditions. Rieser, Pick,
Ashmead, and Garing (1995) measured adaptation of
locomotor behavior after exposure to various feedback
gains between locomotion and optic field flow under
naturalistic conditions; the measure is entirely within
the sensorimotor system. The dependent measure,
open-loop walking to a target, meets the conditions
that we defined above as necessary to access a sensori-
motor representation: immediate testing, motor execu-
tion, and behavior isomorphic to a stimulus. The result
does not contradict the lack of memory found in our
study, because Rieser et al. measured a parametric
change rather than an episodic memory about a partic-
ular stimulus object.
Other studies relate to perception of heading by
measures that are not isomorphic to the stimulus, and
do not directly engage sensorimotor capabilities as
defined in this paper (Cutting, Vishton, Flu¨chiger,
Baumberger, & Gerndt, 1997; Wang & Cutting, 1999).
In these studies the subjects experience an optic flow
field, and judge the direction of their simulated passive
locomotion. The response is symbolic rather than iso-
morphic to a heading, defining a cognitive-system activ-
ity in our terms.
The cognitive:sensorimotor distinction can also clar-
ify contrasts of response methods that come from other
research traditions. Brungart, Rabinowitz and Durlach
(2000) compare four methods of indicating locations of
nearby objects: a direct-location method with an iso-
morphic pointer, two methods pointing to a model of
the target space, and a verbal method. In our interpre-
tation the direct method probes the sensorimotor sys-
tem, while the other three methods probe the cognitive
system because there is no isomorphism between stimu-
lus position and motor action. Indeed, the direct
method was relatively unbiased and more accurate than
the other methods, consistent with our results.
In some experimental designs and patterns of results,
double dissociation cannot prove the presence of two
underlying processes (Dunn & Kirsner, 1988). Our re-
sults differ from these conditions in several ways. First,
the motor results in Experiment 1 at no delay and at
1 s delay show no Roelofs effect, juxtaposed with a
substantial effect in the cognitive measure. Thus the
two measures are not correlated — knowing the motor
response with a given frame position does not aid in
predicting what the verbal response will be, because the
motor response is the same regardless of frame posi-
tion. Further, the stimulus conditions are identical for
the two measures, with only the response mode chang-
ing. The crossing of the two lines in Fig. 6 shows that
range nonlinearities in a single representation cannot
account for the result.
In conclusion, our results are consistent with the
results cited above in psychophysical investigations,
neurophysiological studies and neurological patients,
suggesting that the most parsimonious theoretical inter-
pretation of our results is in terms of two distinct
representations of visual space in normal humans. In-
formation storage in the sensorimotor system lasts
about 2 s for limb movements, motor performance is
unrelated to small differences in reaction times, and
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sensorimotor system information is available to control
an action triggered by a cognitive choice.
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